Kristol and Lowry: More troops and mission creep

William Kristol and Rich Lowry - Reinforce Baghdad - washingtonpost.com

These two leading conservative commentators call for a lot more boots on the ground, mainly in Baghdad.

The bottom line is this: More U.S. troops in Iraq would improve our chances of winning a decisive battle at a decisive moment. This means the ability to succeed in Iraq is, to some significant degree, within our control. The president should therefore order a substantial surge in overall troop levels in Iraq, with the additional forces focused on securing Baghdad.

They go on to say that Iraq’s security forces are just not ready yet, and that while we don’t want to create a culture of dependency, things have come to such a pass that we have no better choice. It’s worth reading their editorial in full.


Kevin Drum responds
:

I swear, I almost think we should go ahead and agree to let them do this. If it would settle the question once and for all, I think I would.

But it wouldn’t, of course. If it didn’t work, they’d just write another column blaming the failure on something else. Lack of willpower, maybe. Or the French.

In any case, it’s telling that they use the word “surge” and decline to provide an estimate of just how many more troops they think we need. A few thousand? Fifty thousand? Where are they going to come from? And do they really think that a surge would do the job? If they had the courage of their convictions, they’d provide a number, tell us what was needed to get the additional troops (pull them out of Korea? call up more reserves? extend tours of duty? institute a draft?), and admit candidly that these troops would need to be in country for at least several years. But they don’t.

If we try to estimate how many more troops might be needed, at a minimum, we would have to consider Anbar province as well as Baghdad. A classified report by the senior Marine intelligence officer in Iraq, Colonel Pete Devlin (reported in the WaPo and NYTimes), describes a deteriorating situation in Anbar.

The political and security situation in western Iraq is grim and will continue to deteriorate unless the region receives a major infusion of aid and a division is sent to reinforce the American troops operating there … Without the deployment of an additional division, “there is nothing MNF-W can do to influence the motivation of the Sunni to wage an insurgency,” the report states, according to a military officer familiar with it. MNF-W stands for Multinational Force-West, the formal name of the Marine command. A division numbers about 16,000 troops.

Of course, Devlin’s reference to a division is just an estimate, for Anbar province, which certainly would not imply a guarantee of success if that number were deployed. But, considering the much larger population of Baghdad, how about two divisions there, and since we are stretched thin across Iraq, how about one more for the rest of the country. Four divisions. 64,000. (I thought a division was 20,000, thus four would be 80,000.) There it is, 64,000 - 80,000 additional troops, just as a rough guess, with no guarantees of anything. If Kevin Drum, or anyone else, wants a number, there’s a number. My sole point being that it would be unrealistic to suggest that some smaller number might suffice.

There’s another part of the Kristol/Lowry piece that struck me, namely this quote:

“The territory over which we fight is among the most strategically important in the world. Victory will place the most dangerous regime on the planet, Iran’s fascist theocracy, in serious peril. Defeat will leave that same regime inestimably strengthened.”

Wait a minute! Isn’t this “mission creep?” Are we in Iraq because we need a bulwark against Iran’s fascist theocracy? When did this become the reason? I thought we went into Iraq because of the threat of WMDs, because Saddam was a brutal dictator, and because planting a free democracy in the Middle East would begin to treat the root causes of terrorism. And yes, to send a message to countries like Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya, etc.. In all those reasons, there is undoubtedly some connection to Iran.

But this “our victory in Iraq will imperil Iran’s fascist theocracy” is a bit different, isn’t it? Was the war about “On to Baghdad,” i.e. doing important stuff in Iraq? Or was it “On to Teheran … by way of Baghdad.”

I gotta holler “Bullshit!” This is mission creep of the first order. Think about the consequences of defining the mission in Iraq this way. Such a mission requires no other success in Iraq, beyond our troops being there, supplied and not driven out. As long as we can have some number of troops, sitting in tolerably secure bases, dodging IEDs, and moving around in armored columns, regardless of what else is happening (good or bad) in Iraq, then some could claim, “Aha, but we are holding the line against the mullahs in Iran.” Sorry. That’s a new game; that’s a different game. That is not what we signed up for.

Trackbacks & Pings

  1. The Moderate Voice on 12 Sep 2006 at 11:58 am

    Troop levels and mission-creep in Iraq…

    At The Politburo Diktat there is a back of the envelope estimate of troop levels that might be needed in Iraq to achieve what we have been told i……

  2. Troop levels and mission-creep in Iraq | Random Fate on 12 Sep 2006 at 12:00 pm

    […] At The Politburo Diktat there is a back of the envelope estimate of troop levels that might be needed in Iraq to achieve what we have been told is the mission there, along wtih a brief comment on mission-creep. […]

Comments

  1. BloodSpite wrote:

    I’ll stick to my guns and say 200,000.

    the first 80-100,000 for the locations you specified.

    The second to split among the border of Iraq to help control the influx of arms from Syria & Iran the other half being used as a rotationary reserve to give at least 40-50,000 troops more down time

    Thats my numbers and I’m sticking to it.

    Heavy handed? Yes.

    And your dead on in regards to the mission creep.

  2. Bill from INDC wrote:

    First, I have to call bullshit on you calling bullshit. Maintaining a hedge against Iran spreading influence to Iraq is an implicit component of the establishment of democracy in Iraq. I find it odd that you label that mission creep, especially in light of the fact that Iran has decided to engage us on the battlefield in Iraq (via proxies), thus CAUSING some of the instability that hampers our original goal. Again, an odd assessment on your part, IMO. That’s just dealing with facts on the ground.

    As far as Anbar goes, I happen to be researching that region for a side project, and I’ve been told that it’s not quite as bad (or much different from what it’s always been) as is depicted in the intelligence report or Ricks’ article about the report. The problems are mostly centered around Ramadi.

    Finally - I think your highlight of the juxtaposition between Drum’s post and Kristol and Lowry’s non-specific demand is good (especially Drum’s point). So the next question is - asked as someone who was planning on trying to figure this out - where is the best analysis of US military force structure, outlining options and limitations of reassignment of troops to Iraq?

    You know someone’s done it. Well. We need a look at the real options. Kristol and Lowry should have done that legwork prior to putting that argument in the WaPo.

  3. Bill from INDC wrote:

    It also strikes me that this determination of capability (again, that someone, somewhere has done well and in non-partisan fashion) is necessary to determine if Rumsfeld et al’s refusal to send more troops is:

    1. A political calculation

    2. Delusion

    3. Because it’s impossible.

    If its strictly point one, I’d think we’d see an uptick of deployment after November. If it’s 2, 3 or a combo of both, we aren’t fighting to win based on original criteria.

    In a sense, it’s very important that Lowry and Kristol are making this argument, as they have the ear of those in the admin. But their refusal to use specifics diminishes the impact, as well as opening them up to suspicions of half-hearted ass-covering prior to a foreign policy failure.

  4. Geek, Esq. wrote:

    Well, the trouble is that we also need more troops in Anbar and in Afghanistan because the Taliban are back.

    Lowry and Kristol take the approach towards troops–saying we need to dedicate more without having any idea where they’d come from–that conservatives used to bash liberals for when it came to spending tax dollars (of course, we’re in the Medicare D era now).

  5. BloodSpite wrote:

    Something everyone seems to overlook is that military spending is barely 3.8%

    In World War II spending was over 43%

    While I’m not endorsing we spend 40% on the military I am endorsing that our military is grossly underbudgeted for this type of operation.

  6. Bill from INDC wrote:

    Bloodspite -

    Military spending is really 4.7%, which is still historically low/reasonable.

  7. dorkafork wrote:

    Think about the consequences of defining the mission in Iraq this way. Such a mission requires no other success in Iraq, beyond our troops being there, supplied and not driven out. As long as we can have some number of troops, sitting in tolerably secure bases, dodging IEDs, and moving around in armored columns, regardless of what else is happening (good or bad) in Iraq, then some could claim, “Aha, but we are holding the line against the mullahs in Iran.”

    I did not get a sense of that at all from the relevant quote on Iran. Particularly when the sentence right after “Defeat will leave that same regime inestimably strengthened.” is “If there is any significant possibility that the presence of more American soldiers on the ground would raise the odds of success, not putting those soldiers on the ground is a crime.” This is quite at odds with the idea that we should just have troops in Iraq “regardless of what else is happening (good or bad).”

    I could see it described as a “shifting rationale”, but I don’t think it matches the usual use of the term “mission creep”. Mainly because it doesn’t sound like they are changing the mission, they still are aiming at setting up a stable democracy in Iraq (the “success” they are talking about), and pointing out the consequences of failure.

  8. commissar wrote:

    Bill, Dorkafork

    Maybe it’s not mission creep, maybe it’s mission ’shrink.’ If one original goal was to establish a secure & democratic Iraq, THAT would have had a number of benefits. To now elevate an anti-mullah Mesopotamian Maginot Line (I’ve been pondering that bit of alliteration all morning) as the “core point” is quite a goal-shift. Read Stuntz’s (?) full quote. He talks about the “territory on which we fight.” No need for democracy, nor stability, nor a secular society, nor anything but an occupied trench line is needed to hold that core point.

    As long as we are not driven from the field militarily, if we accomplish NOTHING else towards building a successful Iraqi society, we could still invoke the Stuntzian Line as a justificiation. That seems quite dangerous to me. Nor is this a “slippery slope;” Stuntz, Kristol & Lowry are doing it today. Iraq is a mess and they are saying, “But we gotta hold off the Mullahs! THAT’s the core point.”

  9. dorkafork wrote:

    No specific mention of democracy in that short quote chosen by Kristol and Lowry. The original quote comes from page 2 of this piece Stuntz wrote for The Weekly Standard. That piece includes this argument:

    We are fighting all three enemies in Iraq today…

    Each of those groups loses big if a democratic regime is successfully established in Iraq. Baathist Syria will be less stable if Iraq is more so. A stable Iraq will show that Sunnis and Shiites can live together peacefully without a Sunni autocrat’s boot, a terrible message for Sunni jihadists. And Shiite jihadism loses the most of all. Iran, now the biggest danger to American interests in the region, is potentially our most valuable friend, because Iran’s population is more pro-American than any other Muslim people save the Kurds. A moderate Shiite-led democracy in Iraq would offer the Iranian people a picture of the alternative the mullahs and madmen who rule Tehran have denied them. That might mean the end of the current Iranian regime, in the not too distant future.

    I would be concerned if they were trying to make the Maginot Line argument, but I see no reason to believe they are. They are working from the assumption that “success” in Iraq is and remains helping set up a stable democracy. And success in that original mission is what will imperil the mullahs in Iran.

  10. john wrote:

    The Bush administration will never do it, that would be an invalidation of the “Rumsfield Doctrine”. This adminstration (and it’s blind supportors) are loath to admit they were wrong and anybody else could be right. It was a wrong decission to go into Iraq when we did, but it will be far worse when we let it slip into anarchy and revolution. We did not have enough troops when we went into this misadventure, and I believe it is to late now make any difference now.

  11. DavidC wrote:

    “The Bush administration will never do it”

    I have to agree. How is it politically & diplomatically feasible to send it more troops when the administration has been regularly touting the progress made by Iraqi security forces?

    Does the Iraqi government want more U.S. troops? If not, what is the U.S. supposed to tell them? Sorry guys, all that stuff about turning security over to you, well, we changed our mind.

    It’s not just a question of U.S. political considerations. The administration has tied itself to a policy of Iraqi-izing the war. I can’t see it going back on that now and sending in more troops, barring some sort of dramatic development in Iraq.

    And I disagree that sending more troops at this point is even a good idea. We are committed to building up Iraqi military and security forces. We can’t turn the clock back, scrap everything and start over. It’s not going to happen. I’ll be amazed to see major changes in our Iraq strategy before there’s a new administration in 2008.

  12. Jason Coleman wrote:

    I’m sorry, Commisar, I usually agree with you but I’m going to have to disagree with you on this one.

    By your logic, everything in WW2 that was not a direct assault on Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan would be considered “mission creep”.

    Protecting a feldgling democracy from the influences and malicious intent of a neighboring Islamic Theocracy is EXACTLY the mission now.

    There was a mission, to induce regime change, and that mission was accomplished. Now the mission is to allow that new regime to strenghten and grow to a point where it can defend itself from it’s enemies. Make no mistake that Iran has indeed labeled the new regime in Iraq as the enemy, and it is our duty, our responsibility and indeed our mission to protect the new Iraqi government from any who would try to roll it back to Saddam’s age or instill a Islamic Theocracy in the region.

    I understand where you’re coming from, but this is not “mission creep”, it’s simply, the mission. That mission being, to protect the new Iraqi government from elements that would like to see it destroyed.

    –Jason

  13. Geek, Esq. wrote:

    Let me get this straight:

    We took out Iran’s archenemy, Saddam, in order to contain Iran?

    Did these ninnies not see this coming when they agitated for war in the first place.

    Then again, Lowry was talking about how we had defeated the insurgency a year ago, so he’ll be back with a 4th or 5th opinion in a few months.

  14. commissar wrote:

    Dorkafork,

    Okay, the context of Stuntz’ piece does include the full argument. Maybe I should not read too much of K/L’s extract of it.

    Bloodspite,

    Your numbers look good to me. It would take a lot.

  15. Bill from INDC wrote:

    We took out Iran’s archenemy, Saddam, in order to contain Iran?

    Did these ninnies not see this coming when they agitated for war in the first place.

    Oh, so now Geek Esq is a fan of Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam! Will wonders never cease?!

    Yes: the long term goal of creating a stable democratic Iraq will help contain things like the theocracy represented by Iran and the fascism in Syria. As Iran asserts its interest in this war, it directly works against this goal. Thus, a defeat for Iraqi democracy increases the power of the mullahs, given their status as regional superpower. This isn’t mission creep, it’s recognizing the downside of Iraqi disengagement, as well as putting this aspect of a failure within the context of the original goal.

    The stakes are why it’s relevant for Rumsfeld et al to committ the force necessary, or stop arguing that it’s so important. The question is, can they?

  16. Geek, Esq. wrote:

    Yes: the long term goal of creating a stable democratic Iraq will help contain things like the theocracy represented by Iran and the fascism in Syria.

    Syria has never needed containing.

    And, Saddam was a perfectly adequate bulwark against Iran.

    So, we already effectively had Iran and Syria contained before the invasion of Iraq.

    Then again, we also had the Taliban and AQ on the run in Afghanistan before we started the Iraq folly too.

    Anyhoo, Bush needs a lot more troops for Afghanistan, al-Anbar, and Baghdad (and better make plans for a British withdrawal from southern Iraq ex post Tony Blair).

    Where are these troops going to come from? And why does Don Rumsfeld still have a job?

    If there’s one thing we know, it’s that Bush won’t make any major increase in troops until after the November elections.