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History of Marine Corps Aviation
Vietnam
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It was an interesting operation in the light of what was to follow. The entire sub-unit for the operation of the base at Soc Trang was flown from Okinawa by C-130s in less than five days into a field 3,000 feet long with jury-rigged navigational aids. The next day HMM-362 arrived from USS Princeton, during an all day procession of lifts, with all its equipment and personnel from about 20 miles off the coast. In the lift from the ship, 362 were assisted by HMM-261, the squadron regularly assigned to Princeton as part of the Special Landing Force, 7th Fleet. 33
By the latter half of 1964, the Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Vietnam had grown to about 20,000 U.S. personnel and had a new name, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). Marine Aviation was continuously represented in country from 1962 by the helicopter squadron of Task Unit Shufly. Up to 1964, helicopter squadrons of the 1st MAW had been rotated to Shufly about every four or five months. Thus, by the time the escalation of U.S. forces began in early 1965, the 1st MAW had considerable experience in the tactics and operation of helo troop lifts in Vietnam combat.
The commitment of U.S. forces had its beginning in early August 1964. Ships of the 7th Fleet on surveillance missions off the North Vietnam coast were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the night of August 2.
With growing harassment of American compounds in Vietnam in the latter months of 1964, retaliatory strikes were ordered against the North. On February 7, carrier strikes from Task Force 77 hit enemy barracks at Dong Hoi and, on the 11th, 99 aircraft from Ranger, Hancock and Coral Sea bombed and strafed the North Vietnamese barracks at Chanhoa. On the same day, South Vietnam and U.S. Air Force aircraft also struck Vu Con. These strikes were the start of a bombing operation against North Vietnam called Rolling Thunder, designed to increase both in intensity and depth of penetration. Rolling Thunder was conducted in conjunction with a similar operation against the panhandle of Laos, in an attempt to inhibit the passage of troops and supplies from North Vietnam to the south. The Laos operation was called Barrel Roll. Both of these strike programs against the North marked the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, although a considerable number of actions against the Viet Cong preceded them in the south.
Marines at Danang
On March 8, 1965, in response to a decision of President Lyndon Johnson, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) landed at Danang to protect the airfield from possible communist attack. By mid-March, the air component of the brigade consisted of two medium tranport helicopter squadrons, one light anti-aircraft missile battalion, and a group headquarters, MAG-16. All the aviation units were attached to MAG-16 under Colonel John H. King, Jr. On April 10, additional tactical aircraft arrived at Danang when Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron 513 landed after a nonstop, aerial refueling flight from Atsugi. Ground personnel and equipment were flown in by the KC-130s of the 1st MAW. Also during April, the need arose for electronic warfare aircraft to counter the growing use of surface-to-air missiles. Marine Composite Squadron (VMCJ) 1 at Iwakuni, Japan, has the best aircraft for this mission. The EF-10Bs were soon effectively supporting USAF, Navy and Marine strike groups on their missions, Fortunately, 1st MAW was able to support MAG-16 with a detachment of KC-130s based in Japan.In May, the 3rd MEB, under Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, landed at Chu Lai about 50 miles south of Danang. The brigade was composed of the 4th Marines and MAG-12, plus Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10. One of its principal objectives was to select a site and construct a second major jet-capable airfield.
The first step was the installation of a short airfield for tactical support (SATS), a Marine Aviation concept which provided a field complete with carrier deck-type arresting gear, catapult and an aluminum surface of interlocking light- weight metal alloy planking. The concept also included a tactical airfield fuel dispensing system. Much difficulty was encountered with the base of soft sand at Chu Lai in the installation of the SATS but, by the end of the month, 4,000 feet of usable surface was down and the first landing of an A-4 into the gear was made on June 1, by Colonel John D. Noble, C.O. of MAG-12. By mid-afternoon, with the use of jet-assisted takeoff bottles, the first combat mission was launched from Chu Lai, led by Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Baker, C.O. of VMA-225. On May 11, Major General Paul J. Fontana opened 1st MAW headquarters at Danang and the Marine air-ground team was beginning to function in all respects. By September, more changes had occurred. MAG-36 had deployed from Santa Ana to Chu Lai and was ensconced in a new helicopter field called Ky Ha.
MAG-16 had been relieved of its jet squadrons by the arrival of MAG-11 from Atsugi, and was operating its helicopters from a new base in the immediate area of Danang called Marble Mountain. In the north at Phu Bai, one helo squadron operated in support of the ground units deployed in the vicinity. After the helicopters moved to Marble Mountain, new construction began on a parallel runway at Danang. The shifting, while building and operating, continued through the year and well into 1966 before the new 10,000-foot runway and taxiway systems were completed. At Chu Lai, a similar plan of expansion was laid down in mid-1965 which was realized in the fall of 1966 with a 10,000- foot runway just west of the SATS strip. At that time, MAG-13 came in from Iwakuni and occupied a new area on the west side of the field.
Although there were many helicopter bases of varying capacities, as well as some fixed-wing strips, built in the northern part of I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) in the ensuing years, the foregoing represent the main bases of the 1st MAW units from 1965 to 1970.
In mid-1965, there were nine fixed- wing and five helo squadrons deployed in the 1st MAW. In 1968, there were 14 and 14, or half the deployable squadrons of Marine Aviation. It is also significant that no more squadrons of the Marine Corps could be deployed since all the remainder in the U.S. were required to train either individual replacements or were squadrons participating in the unit rotation program for introduction of new aircraft.
Control of Marine Air
During the Korean War, there was a strong element of dissatisfaction at certain times with the idea of all Marine Aviation tactical units being under the operational control of the 5th Air Force. Several years prior to 1965, CinCPac had convened a special board to examine the employment of tactical air and the lessons to be learned from the Korean War. The board was composed of members of the CinCPac staff and each of the component commands, Army, Navy and Air Force, and was headed by Brigadier General McCutcheon, then- Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, CinCPac.The board met and drew up guidelines for CinCPac directives promulgated in the Vietnam war years. As a result, an agreement was reached between Commander 7th AF (formerly 2nd Air Division) and Commanding General 1st MAW in August 1965, delineating the levels of control. Essentially, this left operational control of Marine Air under the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force, except that single control authority for purposes of air defense was given to the 7th AF. This remained the basic policy for command and control of Marine Aviation in Vietnam until 1968 when the subject arose again.
At the start of the escalation of U.S. deployments to Vietnam, the Marine air control system (MACS) was basically composed of the same elements as in Korea.
In June 1967, MACS-4 arrived in Vietnam, bringing with it a modern semi-automated, computer-oriented TADC which had been developed as a component of the Marine tactical data system (MTDS). MACS-4 was sited on Monkey Mountain, near Danang, a high promontory overlooking the South China Sea. More construction at the site was needed because, in addition to the radars and their antennae, room had to be made in the thick jungle for 16 helicopter- transportable huts for the TADC and for four others that comprised the tactical data communications central (TDCC). It was worth the effort, however, as the TADC gave the wing the ability to handle 250 aircraft tracks, friendly and hostile, simultaneously.
It was recommended that the various service air control systems talk to each other. The TDCC turned out to be the logical link. From the time it was in place, the TADC was operating with the naval tactical data system and the airborne tactical data system units of the 7th Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf, both of which were compatible with MTDS from the development period on. The loop was closed with the Air Force system. Essentially, this allowed the receipt of messages from either Navy, Marine or Air Force systems, the translation of the one received into the other two, and the transmission of the translations to the respective centers where they could be displayed. The net result was that air defense and air control data could be passed from Thailand to Danang to 7th Fleet ships in the Tonkin Gulf, and vice versa.
Ground Attack Missions
Much like Korea, Vietnam for Marine aviation was not an air-to-air show. North Vietnamese aircraft were employed mainly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the 1st MAW concentrated on support of the Marine divisions operating in the I Corps. Three kills of MiGs were credited to Marine pilots, two of whom were on exchange tours of duty with the Air Force, and the third with a Marine F-4 squadron operating aboard America. In direct air support missions, including close air support, there were some notable differences in Vietnam from previous operations. With few exceptions, air strikes had to be controlled by an airborne controller, and there had to be a political clearance in addition to the tactical go-ahead to hit the target. Not only was it necessary to know the exact position of the requesting unit and the target area of the village, but it also was essential to know the location of any friendly villagers or district militia who might be in the environs of the village. This additional clearance requirement sometimes came through the Province Chief, through ARVN channels, or was included in the mission. Needless to say, it was a complicating factor, although essential and understandable. What it did was to minimize the roles of the FAC on the ground and increase the activities of the Forward Air Controllers Airborne. When the A-6A deployed to Vietnam, all-weather air support capability was measurably improved. The A-6 could deliver weapons at night or in bad weather with accuracy approaching that achieved by the A-4 in clear weather. Carrying a normal load of 14,000 pounds of ordnance, this A-6 capability was extremely useful in the monsoon season. Both the F-4 and A-4 were used primarily in direct air support, most of the time in daylight clear weather. The average ordnance loads were 3,000 pounds for the A-4 and 5,000 for the F-4.The F-8 was similarly used from December 1965 to May 1968. VMF-212 embarked in Oriskany in 1965 and flew strikes in both North and South Vietnam. On April 1, 1966, the USMACV was authorized by CinCPac to conduct air strikes in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and north of it in a strike zone known as Route Package One. By midsummer, 1st MAW aircraft were assigned to hit targets in this package, most of them artillery and rocket sites. Late in 1966, Marine A-6s began striking targets as far north as Hanoi and Haiphong, and continued until the bombing halt in 1968. Most of this work was done at night and EA-6As provided electronic jamming, with F-4Bs flying escort.
The EA-6A was indeed a welcome arrival at the 1st MAW late in 1966. By that time, the surface-to-air missile strikes had reached serious proportions and it was only a matter of time before Marine aircraft were frequently encountering the threat. Again VMCJ-1 carried out a major portion of the area reconnaissance and electronic warfare mission for USMACV, just as it did for 5th AF in the Korean War with its photographic reconnaissance. VMCJ-1 provided escort for B-52s, support for tactical air strikes, and collection of all forms of electronic intelligence. On the photorecon side, VMCJ-1 was operating in a science which had become much more sophisticated and was now called "imagery intelligence."
Employment of transports was essentially a story of two aircraft, the KC-130 and the ancient and honorable C-117, the old R4D-8. Normally the C-117 was organic to each MAG and only assigned at a level of one per group. The old Skytrain was certainly the queen of the three-war group, serving in WW II, Korea and Vietnam. VMGR-152, the 1st MAW's KC-130 squadron kept a four- plane detachment at Danang. It did everything in the air transport line that could be done.
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